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THE TEST OF EMPLOYEE STATUS: ECONOMIC
REALITIES AND TITLE VII
NANCY E. DOWD*
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act1 prohibits employment
discrimination in the broadest possible terms. As the Supreme
Court stated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 2 "[t]he objective of Con-
gress in the enactment of Title VII is plain .... It was to achieve
equality of employment opportunities... [by] the removal of artifi-
cial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
other impermissible classification."3 Thus, courts have liberally in-
terpreted the substantive and procedural provisions of Title VII to
ensure the achievement of these goals.4 Courts have prohibited
both the disparate treatment of individuals and the use of policies
that have a disparate impact on protected classes. Even those em-
ployment policies that are fair in form but discriminatory in opera-
tion have been declared unlawful.5 Furthermore, courts have
broadly construed the procedural provisions of the statute to en-
sure maximum access to the statute's remedies for employment
discrimination.6
Some courts have arrested the broad reach of the statute, how-
ever, by applying a narrow test of employee status and thereby re-
moving certain individuals from the Act's protection.7 In the ab-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; B.A., 1971, University of
Connecticut; M.A., 1973, University of Illinois; J.D., 1981, University of Chicago.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(e)17 (1976 & Supp. V 1982). Unless otherwise indicated, all sec-
tion cites refer to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
2. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3. Id. at 429-31.
4. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglass Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Rowe v.
General Motors Corp. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
5. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
6. See Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforce-
ment and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 225, 231-45 (1976).
7. See, e.g., Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 163
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sence of a definition of employee status in the statute, these courts
have utilized the traditional common law test of employee status,
which emphasizes the employer's right to control the alleged em-
ployee." This approach has limited the scope of the statute by de-
claring certain individuals to be independent contractors and thus
not covered by the statute.9 The use of this test plainly mis-
perceives the policy of Title VII and is totally unsupported by the
legislative history. Furthermore, examined in light of its origin and
rationale, the common law test fundamentally conflicts with the
prophylactic goals of Title VII.
This Article examines both the injustices resulting from the use
of the common law test in Title VII cases and the lack of support
for adopting that test to determine employee status under the stat-
ute. The problem is not simply an academic one. Pervasive em-
ployment discrimination continues to prevail in American society
two decades after the passage of Title VII. As the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission pointed out in its final report in November 1983,
before the Commission was reconstituted, a significant gap persists
(1982); Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980); Spirides v. Rein-
hardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); Brown v. American Family Life Assurance Co., 29 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 32,893 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,562 (9th Cir.
1983); Armbruster v. Quinn, 498 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Mich. 1980), rev'd, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th
Cir. 1983); Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard Inc., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980),
rev'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 678 F.2d 911 (11th Cir. 1982); Gutierrez v.
Aero May Flower Transit Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 447 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Takeall v.
WERD, Inc., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 947 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Dumas v. Town of Mt. Vernon,
436 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Ala. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 612 F.2d 974
(5th Cir. 1980); Jenkins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 436 F. Supp. 950 (D. Or. 1977); Smith v. Dutra
Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd mem., 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1076 (1979).
8. See supra note 7.
9. The issue is not limited to the distinction between employees and independent con-
tractors. Most notably, the test arguably should be applied to analyze whether large part-
nerships are subject to Title VII. In Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 2229 (1984), the plaintiff argued that a large law firm partnership
should be viewed, in light of economic realities, as a corporate entity whose partners are
employees, rather than as a voluntary association not covered by Title VII. The district
court and the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and others, and granted the defendant
law firm's motion to dismiss on the basis that Title VII does not apply to partnership deci-
sions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that consideration for partnership was a term
or condition of employment and therefore subject to Title VIII. The Court did not address,
however, the economic realities argument raised by Hishon.
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between the employment opportunities available to minorities and
women and those available to white males.10 That disparity should
not be further aggravated by limiting the scope of the statute
through an arbitrary definition of the individuals to which it ap-
plies. This Article proposes that the analysis of employee status
under Title VII should be based on an examination of the eco-
nomic realities of the employer-employee relationship which would
emphasize the employer's ability to affect an individual's employ-
ment opportunities. This test would properly focus on the dynam-
ics of the employment relationship and would ensure that the com-
prehensive goals of the statute are not compromised by an unduly
narrow test of employee status.
I. TITLE VII AND THE COMMON LAW TEST OF EMPLOYEE STATUS
A. Statutory Language
The definition of employee status is critical to the operation of
Title VII because the prohibitions of the statute are linked to an
individual's actual, former or potential employee status. The criti-
cal provision applicable to employers, for example, provides:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-
1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
10. Recent statistics show that disparities in income and employment continue
unabated. Although employment rates have fluctuated considerably over the
last [twenty-five] years, the rates for minorities have remained about twice as
high as for whites.
.... Thus, while employment discrimination has been declared illegal for
[nineteen] years, qualified minorities and women have been unable to close
significantly the gap in employment status or in median imcome between
themselves and similarly qualified white men.
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 1957-1983, 60-61 (1983). The
Commission cited the following statistics to support its conclusions: "Black males had an
unemployment rate 1.8 times higher than the majority male rate of 4.7 when the census was
taken in 1960 .... By 1983, the black men rate was 2.4 times that of white men ....
Disparities in median family income ... remain as well. Median income for families headed
by white, black, and Hispanic women was 53 percent, 38 percent, and 41 percent, respec-
tively, of the income earned by families headed by white married couples. Id.
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2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.1
Additionally, an employer must employ a minimum of fifteen em-
ployees in order to be subject to the Act.12
The statute fails to define, however, the nexus that creates an
employment relationship sufficient to trigger the provisions of the
Act. The definitional section is circular, defining an "employee" as
an "individual employed by an employer,"' s and an "employer" as
a "person" with the statutory minimum number of "employees.' 14
This lack of a statutory definition detailing the factors that de-
termine employee status has led several courts to adopt the com-
mon law test.' 5 According to these courts, congressional silence in
11. § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
12. § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
13. § 701(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1976) provides:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer, except
that the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office
in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters
thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal
staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate advisor with
respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The
exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees sub-
ject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or
political subdivision.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). See supra text accompanying note 12. The term "per-
son" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. V 1982), which provides:
(a) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, governments, govern-
mental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations,
corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies,
trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11
or receivers.
15. See Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 163
(1982); Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980); Spirides v. Rein-
hardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); Brown v. American Family Life Assurance Co., 29
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 32,893 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,562
(9th Cir. 1982); Armbruster v. Quinn, 498 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Mich. 1980), rev'd, 711 F.2d
1332 (6th Cir. 1983); Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard Inc., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 726 (N.D.
Ga. 1980); Gutierrez v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 447 (N.D. Cal.
1979); Takeall v. WERD, Inc., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 947 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Dumas v.
Town of Mt. Vernon, 436 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Ala. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
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the statute and the lack of any affirmative indication of a particu-
lar test of employee status in the legislative history"' indicate that
Congress intended courts to apply the traditional common law test
of employee status.17 As one court has stated,
We find no indication that Congress intended the words of the
statute to have anything but their ordinary meaning as com-
monly understood. Absent guidance from the Supreme Court,
we conclude therefore that the term "employee" in cases under
Title VII is to be construed in light of general common law
concepts.18
Congressional silence is therefore viewed as establishing a pre-
sumption that the common law test should apply, a presumption
which is not overcome by the policy goals of the statute or the rule
of liberal constuction that courts generally have applied to its
terms. As one court has noted, "While the [c]ourt agrees. . . that
Title VII is not to be construed narrowly, there is nothing in the
legislative history of the Act to indicate a Congressional intent to
construe the term 'employee' in any manner other than in accor-
dance with common-law agency principles." 119 Thus, cloaked in the
guise of conservative statutory construction and judicial approba-
tion of broadening Title VII beyond congressional "intent," these
courts have read congressional silence as an affirmative policy deci-
sion to limit the reach of Title VII to those individuals who qualify
as "employees" under the traditional common law test.
grounds, 612 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1980); Jenkins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 436 F. Supp. 950 (D. Or.
1977); Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affd mem. 580 F.2d
1054 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1076 (1979).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 20-53. These courts have failed to examine fully
the statute's legislative history which, contrary to the assertion that there is no indication of
how Congress intended the term "employee" to be construed, indicates that Congress in-
tended the term to be given a liberal reading.
17. See, e.g., Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337 (11th Cir. 1982); Dumas v. Town of
Mt. Vernon, 436 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Ala. 1977); Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp.
513 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
18. Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340-41 (11th Cir. 1982). The court conceded
that the economic realities of the employment should be reviewed. These realities are as-
sessed, however, in light of the common law principles of agency. See id. at 341.
19. Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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B. The Common Law Test
Arising from common law notions of the employment relation-
ship, the traditional test of employee status focuses on the em-
ployer's right to control the worker. The classic formulation of the
test is stated in section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, which distinguishes between servants or employees and
independent contractors.20 In defining an employee in terms of the
employer's right to control the worker, the Restatement suggests
numerous factors for courts to consider, including the extent of
control, the nature of the employee's occupation, the method of
payment, and the degree of integration of the employee's work into
the employer's regular business.21
Despite the long list of factors set out by the Restatement,
courts generally have focused on the employer's right to control
the physical conduct of the individual as the critical determinant
of employee status when applying the common law test.2 2 The
right to control is viewed as a relative factor and is judged not by
its actual 'exercise but rather by the employer's authority to use
20. Definition of Servant
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of
the services is subject to the other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an indepen-
dent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master
and servant; and
(i) whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
21. See id.
22. See infra notes 23-29.
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it. 23 The employer always retains the ability to control the worker,
whether directly or indirectly, by virtue of its control over the re-
sults of the work performed.2 4 The distinction rests on the em-
ployer's ability to control the means and methods used to achieve
the results.25 If the authority to control the means and methods of
performance exists, the worker is an employee; if it is absent, the
worker is deemed an independent contractor.2"
The common law test, however, permits an employer to impose
requirements and specifications upon work results that may sub-
stantially affect the means and methods of job performance with-
out thereby making the worker an employee.27 Conversely, because
the right to control actually need not be exercised, the employer
may permit the worker to exercise considerable discretion and may
impose only limited supervision, and the worker will still be con-
sidered an employee.2 8 The key is whether the employer has the
authority to direct the physical conduct of the worker in the course
of the performance of the work.29
Courts that have adopted the common law test to determine em-
ployee status under Title VII similarly have focused on the right to
control as the determinant of employee status.30 Factors that have
23. See, e.g., Pickens Plummer v. Diecker & Bros., 21 Ohio St. 212, 215 (1871) ("If [the
employer] had the authority to the extent indicated, the fact that [he] chose to leave the
details to [the employee's] discretion would not alter the relation of the parties."); Chicago,
R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Bennett, 36 Okla. 358, 362, 128 P. 705, 707 (1912) ("[T]he test is not
whether the defendant did in fact control and direct plaintiff in his work, but is whether it
had the right under the contract of employment, taking into account the circumstances and
situation of the parties and the work, to so control and direct him in the work."); Hardaker
v. Idle Dist. Council, [1896] 1 Q.B. 351, 353 ("It is this unlimited right of control, whether
actually exercised or not, vhich ... is the condition for inferring the responsibility of the
master.").
24. E.g., Alexander v. R.A. Sherman's Sons, 86 Conn. 292, 85 A. 514 (1912); Prest-O-Lite
Co. v. Skeel, 182 Ind. 593, 106 N.E. 365 (1914); Harmon v. Ferguson Contracting Co., 159
N.C. 22, 74 S.E. 632 (1912).
25. E.g., Hale v. Johnson, 80 IlM. 185 (1875); Bailey v. Troy & B.R.R. Co., 57 Vt. 252
(1883); Emerson v. Fay, 94 Va. 60, 26 S.E. 386 (1896).
26. E.g., Laffery v. United States Gypsum Co., 83 Kan. 349 (1910); Uppington v. New
York, 165 N.Y. 222, 59 N.E. 91 (1901); Smith v. Simmons, 103 Pa. 32 (1883); Erie v. Caul-
kins, 85 Pa. 247 (1877).
27. E.g., Hayes v. Chicago, 0. & P.R. Co., 203 II. App. 472 (1916); Hughes v. Cincinnati &
S.R. Co., 39 Ohio 461 (1883); Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Pa. 247 (1877).
28. See supra note 24.
29. See supra notes 22-28.
30. Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 341 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[fIt is the economic
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been considered by these courts in determining the degree of con-
trol over the means and methods of work include whether the indi-
vidual is supervised and the degree and nature of supervision;3'
whether the individual must work at scheduled times or is free to
set his or her own hours;3 2 whether the daily work of the individual
is governed by standards set by the employer;33 and whether the
individual has discretion in performing the work and, if so, to what
degree.34 Other factors courts have considered relevant include
whether equipment used in performing work is provided by the
employer or the worker,3 5 and whether the worker must perform
the work personally or may hire others who are not selected or su-
pervised by the employer to complete the work.36 In conjunction
with these factors, courts also have considered critical the struc-
ture of compensation and benefits that the employee receives, in-
cluding the method by which the individual is compensated, such
as by a salary or by commission; 7 the employee's entitlement to
fringe benefits, such as health insurance or pension benefits;38 and
realities of the relationship viewed in light of the common law principles of agency and the
right of the employer to control the employee that are determinative."); Lutcher v. Musi-
cians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The extent of the employer's right
to control the means and manner of the worker's performance is a primary factor."); Gutier-
rez v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 447, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("An
individual is to be deemed an employee when 'the person for whom the work is done has the
right to control and direct the work, not only as to the result accomplished by the work, but
also as to the details and means by which the result is accomplished... .' ").
31. See Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Du-
tra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
32. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 498 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Jenkins v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 436 F. Supp. 950 (D. Or. 1977).
33. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Takeall v. WERD, Inc.,
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 947 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
34. See Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980); Durrett v.
Jenkins Brickyard Inc., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Gutierrez v. Aero
Mayflower Transit Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 447 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
35. See Gutierrez v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 447 (M.D. Fla.
1979); Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
36. See Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337 (11th Cir. 1982).
37. See Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980); Spirides v.
Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Jenkins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 436 F. Supp. 950 (D.
Or. 1977); Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
38. See Jenkins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 78 (D. Or. 1977); Brown v.
American Family Assurance Co., 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 32,893 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 31
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,562 (9th Cir. 1982).
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the employer's withholding of income taxes and contribution of so-
cial security taxes.3 9 Finally, these courts also have looked to any
written contract between the employer and the individual that
designates the worker's status as an employee or as an indepen-
dent contractor. 40
The courtz' common law inquiry into employee status under Ti-
tle VII has Iocused, therefore, on characteristics of the employ-
ment relationship that are easily measured, quantitative factors
that indicate the employer's ability to control the physical conduct
of employees. As applied in particular Title VII cases, this often
has led to a limited, mechanistic analysis of the employment
relationship.
The tendency to focus solely on a few easily measured factors, at
the expense of excluding other potentially significant factors, is ex-
emplified by the court's analysis in Dumas v. Town of Mount
Vernon.41 In Dumas the court considered whether CETA workers
for a municipality were employees for purposes of determining
whether the employer had the minimum number of employees to
be subject to Title VII.42 The court determined that these workers
were not employees solely because they were selected and paid by
the local CETA office.43 The municipality's lack of control over hir-
ing, therefore, was enough to deny these workers employee sta-
tus. 44 The court considered irrelevant the town's ability to disci-
pline and discharge the CETA workers, and made no examination
of the supervision of the employees, the nature of their work, or
the municipality's power to direct their daily .physical activities. 5
In another case involving a truck driver, Gutierrez v. Aero
Mayflower Transit Co.,46 the court similarly indicated that a single
39. See Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980); Spirides v.
Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Gutierrez v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 22 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 947 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
40. See Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980); Spirides v.
Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Gutierrez v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 22 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 447 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
41. 436 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Ala. 1977).
42. See id. at 872.
43. See id. at 873.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 872.
46. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 447 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
1984]
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factor could determine employee or independent contractor sta-
tus.4 7 In Gutierrez the court focused exclusively upon the written
contract between the parties. 4 The court noted that the contract
designated the driver as an independent contractor and, further-
more, provided that the driver was to provide some of the equip-
ment used, to pay his own operating costs, and to hire his own
helpers.49 In determining the driver's status as an independent
contractor, however, the court focused on the provision giving the
driver discretion over the manner and method of performing haul-
ing services. This provision, the court held, "is itself sufficient to
support a finding that the truckmen who contract with defendant
are independent contractors under the right to control test. '50 The
court therefore reduced its analysis of employee status to this sin-
gle aspect of the employment relationship, and relied solely upon
the contract to determine its existence.
In addition to encouraging a simplistic, single-factor analysis of
employee status, the use of the common law test in Title VII cases
has encouraged courts to focus on the formal structure of the em-
ployment relationship, rather than upon the reality of employer-
employee interaction. This is particularly evident in several cases
involving insurance salespersons and manufacturers' representa-
tives in which courts have focused on compensation arrangements
and control of the work schedule as determinative of whether these
workers are employees or independent contractors. 51
Salespersons and manufacturers' representatives commonly are
paid on commission, do not participate in available benefit plans,
and must deduct their own income and social security taxes. Fur-
thermore, these individuals usually work flexible hours to accom-
modate clients. Courts applying the right-to-control test commonly
have viewed the flexible work schedule and commission compensa-
47. See id.
48. See id. at 448.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 449.
51. See Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated on
other grounds, 456 U.S. 1002 (1982); Brown v. American Family Life Assurance Co., 29
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,893 (C.D. Cal.) rev'd, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 33,562
(9th Cir. 1982); Armbruster v. Quinn, 498 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Jenkins v. Trav-
elers Ins. Co., 436 F. Supp. 950 (D. Or. 1977).
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tion as indicative of employee autonomy; because the employer
controls only the ultimate results of the work performed by these
individuals, they are considered to be independent contractors.52
Totally absent from this analysis is an examination of the nature
of the interaction between these workers and the employer: the
standards imposed on ultimate performance, the structure of the
commission arrangement, the basis for and control of career oppor-
tunities, or the dependence of the worker on support functions
performed by the employer. Furthermore, the emphasis on form
over substance also permits employers to avoid Title VII coverage
simply by following a particular pattern when establishing the
terms and conditions of specific jobs.
The failure to go beyond the formal structure of employment re-
lationships, combined with the limited factors examined by many
courts, also ignores the range of employment relationships sub-
sumed under the heading of independent contractor. The analysis
applied to the worker who is an integral part of business opera-
tions is the same as the analysis applied to independent business-
men hired to complete a discrete task not ordinarily part of the
employer's business. Thus, salesmen and manufacturers' represent-
atives are grouped with subcontractors and workers hired to per-
form a single job; all are classified as independent contractors not
covered by Title VII.53 This analysis fails to distinguish between an
individual who essentially contracts with the employer from a rela-
tively equal bargaining position and the worker who is involved in
an ongoing relationship in which significant direct or indirect con-
trol is retained by the employer. In the latter relationship, bargain-
ing power with respect to the terms and conditions of employment
rests almost entirely with the employer.
In sum, the application of the common law test results in the
arbitrary exclusion of independent contractors from Title VII cov-
erage based on an analysis which is unduly simplistic. This analy-
sis excludes workers from Title VII not on the basis of the realities
52. See supra note 51.
53. Compare Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337 (11th Cir. 1982) (custodial services);
Durett v. Jenkins Brickyard Inc., 23 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (construction
subcontractor) with Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981) (manu-
facturer's representative); Brown v. American Family Assurance Co., 29 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 32,893 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,562 (9th Cir. 1982).
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of their interaction with employers, but rather upon the existence
or nonexistence of a limited set of factors in the formal structure of
the employment relationship. It recognizes no distinction in the
nature of the contractual relationships between the range of indi-
viduals designated independent contractors and their employers,
but instead classifies these individuals into an undifferentiated
class unrelated to their role in the employer's business.
The fundamental injustice resulting from the use of the common
law test of employee status in Title VII cases is that the test fails
to consider the employee's perspective of the relationship and the
employer's ability to manipulate access to employment opportuni-
ties and to control the terms and conditions of employment. By
focusing solely upon the employer's ability to control the physical
conduct of the employee, the test adopts a one-sided view of the
relationship that ignores the worker's status in the relationship. In
examining the issue of control solely from the employer's perspec-
tive in order to limit the employer's responsibility to the worker,
courts ignore the worker's economic dependence on the employer's
control of the terms and conditions of employment.
Consequently, the common law test utterly fails to address the
concern which is at the heart of Title VII: whether the worker ac-
tually or potentially stands in a relationship in which the em-
ployer's control over employment opportunities permits the erec-
tion of artificial, unnecessary barriers to those opportunities based
on the worker's race, sex, national origin, or religion. Instead, the
common law test arbitrarily excludes workers classified as indepen-
dent contractors from Title VII coverage. This denial of Title VII's
protection to these workers is not justified by the court's rationale
that the common law test should be adopted in the face of congres-
sional failure to define employee status. Rather, this conclusion re-
flects inadequate statutory analysis that ignores the legislative his-
tory of Title VII and the policy embodied in the statute's terms.
An examination of the overall statutory scheme, the legislative his-
tory, and the policy goals of Title VII demonstrates that Congress
in fact intended that the definition of employee status be liberally
construed to achieve the broad remedial goals of the statute.5'
54. See infra text accompanying notes 55-102.
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II. A CRITIQUE OF THE COMMON LAW TEST: STATUTORY SCHEME,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND THE POLICY OF TITLE VII
A. Statutory Scheme
One of the most perplexing aspects of the analysis used by
courts that have adopted the common law test of employee status
is their narrow focus upon the definitional section55 of the statute
in determining the appropriate test of employee status. This analy-
sis fails to consider the term "employee" in the context of the
overall statutory scheme. Isolating the definition of "employee"
without considering the context in which it is used in the rest of
the statute ignores the integral role of the term in effectuating the
goals of the statute. Indeed, a narrow definition of employee status
is inconsistent with the broad reach of the statute's prohibitions
and enforcement structure, as well as with the steady expansion of
its coverage to increasing numbers of employees.
The prohibitions against employment discrimination contained
in Title VII are sweeping, and presume an equally expansive defi-
nition of employee status in order to achieve the statute's goals. It
is unlawful to discriminate with respect to the terms and condi-
tions of employment or "in any way" to "deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee."5' The proscribed conduct
is not limited, therefore, to an actual employment relationship, but
also extends to conduct affecting access to employment.
Furthermore, by bringing within its terms not only employers
but also unions57 and employment agencies,5 8 the statute covers
both direct and indirect employment relationships. This broad
coverage reflects a recognition of pervasive institutional and socie-
tal discrimination and the necessity of providing a means to elimi-
nate this discrimination in both its overt and subtle forms. Thus,
the entire structure that controls and affects employment opportu-
nities is covered by the Act. In order to eliminate the "artificial,
55. § 701(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1976).
56. § 703(a), (b), (c), and (d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (b), (c), and (d) (1976).
57. See § 701(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. V 1981); § 703(c) and (d), 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(c) and (d) (1976); § 704, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
58. See § 701(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. V 1981); § 703(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b)
(1976); § 704, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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arbitrary and unnecessary barriers" 9 of discrimination in the em-
ployment structure, a broad definition of employee status is pre-
sumed in order to guarantee a means to challenge and eradicate
unlawful discrimination.
The enforcement section of the statute is similarly predicated on
a policy of ensuring broad access to the protections of the statute
in order to achieve its remedial goals.6 0 The Act provides a right of
action for a "person aggrieved," 1 and a complaint may be filed by
or on behalf of that person. 2 Standing to sue therefore is conferred
to the fullest extent constitutionally permissible, 3 and is limited
only by the article III requirement that the person aggrieved
demonstrate injury in fact."4 Anyone in the zone of interest of the
statute who suffers either economic or non-economic injury be-
cause of employment discrimination is included within its terms.6 5
Such an expansive right of action presumably contemplates that
the status of employees also would be liberally construed.
The intention of Congress to include the widest range of individ-
uals under Title VII is also apparent in the steady legislative ex-
pansion of the number of employees covered by the Act. Congress
has consistently reduced the minimum number of employees nec-
essary to bring an employer within the terms of the statute. In the
original Act, the number of employees necessary to trigger cover-
age of the employer was to decline annually from one hundred to
seventy-five to fifty, and finally reach the statutory requirement of
twenty-five in the fourth year after enactment.66 When the Act was
amended in 1972, the number was reduced to fifteen employees.67
Concurrently, the 1972 amendments also brought public employ-
59. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
60. See § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
61. § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
62. See § 706(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976).
63. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
64. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
65. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
66. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964).
67. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. Law No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972). The new minimum was effective one year from the date of enactment (March 24,
1972).
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ers and most educational institutions s under the terms of the Act.
This amendment expanded the coverage of the Act enormously by
encompassing an estimated ten to fifteen million additional work-
ers at the time the amendments were passed.6 9 Significantly, this
engendered an exception to the definition of "employee" in the
statute that is designed to exclude elected officials, their personal
staff, and their appointees to policy-making positions.70 The very
narrowness of this exception serves to underscore the pattern of
increasing coverage. Furthermore, it demonstrates that Congress
intended courts to otherwise liberally construe the term "em-
ployee" to accord with the expanded coverage of the Act.
This expansion in Title VII coverage confirms the intention evi-
dent in the structure of the Act from its inception: to ensure the
broadest possible reach to its prohibitions in order to achieve the
goal of eliminating employment discrimination. It is clear that the
definition of employee status was designed to have an equally ex-
pansive role in the statutory scheme. Congress deliberately left the
term "employee" undefined, recognizing the difficulties of con-
structing a technical definition that would include the broad range
of employment relationships. In so doing, Congress encouraged a
flexible definition that would encompass the broadest number of
individuals subject to employment discrimination. This conclusion
is bolstered by an examination of the legislative history of the stat-
ute, which confirms that Congress indeed intended the definition
of employee status to be liberally construed.
B. Legislative History
Both the house and senate reports on Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act address the definition of employee status.7 1 The sec-
68. Religious educational institutions remained exempt from the Act under a provision
excluding all religious corporations, associations, societies, and educational institutions from
the statute with respect to individuals employed to perform work connected with the reli-
gious group's activities. See § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2 (1976).
69. See Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical
Analysis of Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDus. REL. L.J. 1, 52-53
(1977).
70. See supra note 13.
71. For an overview of the legislative history, see Hill, supra note 69. A comprehensive
analysis of the 1964 Act is provided in Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimina-
tion and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. Rav. 1109 (1971), and an
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tion-by-section analysis of the statute in the reports states that the
term "employee" is "defined for purposes of the Act in the manner
common for federal statutes. 7 2 On its face, this reference to other
federal statutes is ambiguous because no single definition for "em-
ployee" prevails in federal labor statutes. An examination of the
history of judicial interpretation of the term "employee" in federal
labor statutes, however, demonstrates that this reference repre-
sents congressional intent to encourage a liberal definition of the
statutory term.
In a series of cases in the 1940's,7 3 the United States Supreme
Court considered the definition of the term "employee" as used in
the National Labor Relations Act,7 4 the Social Security Act,7 5 and
the Fair Labor Standards Act.76 The first case decided by the
Court, NLRB v. Hearst," concerned the interpretation of the term
"employee" in the National Labor Relations Act, which as origi-
nally enacted defined "employee" in much the same fashion as Ti-
tle VII: "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, un-
excellent discussion of the 1972 amendments is contained in Hart and Sape, Title VII Re-
considered. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824
(1972).
72. See H. R. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History of Ti-
tles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 2155. The same comment is repeated in
almost every house and senate report on the statute, with no further elaboration. No further
direct commentary on the definition of employee status is contained in the 1964 or 1972
legislative history. One remark by Senator Clark in the 1964 floor debate indirectly touches
on this issue, but provides no further guidance. In response to a question from Senator
Dirkson regarding whether employers could easily determine if they were subject to the
statute, Clark commented that the term "employer" was "intended to have its common
dictionary meaning, except as expressly qualified by the act." 110 CONG. REc. 7216 (daily ed.
Apr. 8, 1964) (statement of Sen. Clark). This remark is of little assistance, however, because
the context in which it was made did not focus on the definitional issue with respect to
employees. Moreover, dictionary definitions are hardly useful legal criteria, particularly
when a term like "employee" is the product of historical development and therefore subject
to change over time. See infra text accompanying notes 104-124.
73. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947); United States v. Silk,
331 U.S. 704 (1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); see also Walling v.
Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947); Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 410 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
77. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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less [the Act] explicitly states otherwise.178 The case arose from a
publisher's refusal to comply with an order of the National Labor
Relations Board directing it to bargain with a union of newsboys.
The publisher contended that the Board had failed to correctly ap-
ply the common law right-to-control test of employee status, under
which it argued the newsboys were merely independent contractors
and therefore not covered by the NLRA.7 9
The Court emphatically rejected the narrow common law right-
to-control test as the appropriate standard, however, and instead
liberally construed the term "employee" as requiring inquiry into
"the economic facts of the [employment] relation" in order to de-
termine employee status.80 The Court emphasized that Congress
had never treated the term employee as a term of art. "Rather, 'it
takes color from its surroundings. . . [in] the statute where it ap-
pears' . . . and derives meaning from the context of that statute,
which 'must be read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and
the end to be attained.' ,,81 An overly technical definition, the
Court reasoned, would exclude from the Act groups that Congress
sought to protect by enacting a national labor statute."2
Therefore, the definition of employee status had to include those
factors that would indicate whether "particular workers . . . are
subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was
designed to eradicate and that the remedies it affords are appro-
priate for preventing them or curing their harmful effects ... .
Hence, the Court stated the appropriate test in terms of statutory
purpose:
[W]hen the particular situation of employment combines these
characteristics, so that the economic facts of the relation make it
more nearly one of employment than of independent business
enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished by
the legislation, those characteristics may outweigh technical le-
gal classifiction for purposes unrelated to the statute's objectives
78. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
79. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 113-120 (1944).
80. Id. at 128.
81. Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 545
(1940); and South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 259 (1940)).
82. See id. at 125.
83. Id. at 127.
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and bring the relation within its protections.8 4
Under this analysis, the Court held that the newsboys were em-
ployees covered by the protections of the Act. 5
Subsequently, the Court applied the Hearst analysis to define
employee status under both the Social Security Act and the Fair
Labor Standards Act. In United States v. Silk,86 the Court held
that the Hearst test should be applied to determine who was an
employee for purposes of the Social Security Act.8 7 The Court sug-
gested several factors to be considered, but stressed that other fac-
tors could be important. The list included: "degrees of control, op-
portunities for profit or loss, investment in facilities, permanency
of relation and skill required in the claimed independent opera-
tion."88 Similarly, in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,89 the
Court used the Hearst test to liberally interpret the term "em-
ployee" in the Fair Labor Standards Act.90
Congress responded to the Court's interpretation of the term
"employee" in these cases by amending those statutes that it felt
should have a more restrictive definition of employee status, while
leaving the term untouched when it approved of the Court's liberal
construction. Specifically, Congress amended the National Labor
Relations Act to exclude independent contractors from the em-
ployee definition.9' The Supreme Court subsequently interpreted
this amendment to mean that Congress intended that the common
law right-to-control test should determine employee status under
the statute.92 Congress also amended the Social Security Act to re-
84. Id. at 128.
85. See id. at 132.
86. 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 410 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
88. 331 U.S. at 716; see also Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) ("[I]n the
application of social legislation employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are
dependent upon the business to which they render service").
89. 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
90. Id. at 150-53; see also Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947). Sec-
tion 3(e) of the Fair Labor Standards Act defines an "employee" as "any individual em-
ployed by an employer unless specifically exempted." 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976); 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS AcT 1537 (1947).
92. NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968). For an analysis of the common law
test as applied under the NLRA, see Bioff & Paul, Employee and Independent Contractors:
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quire the use of the common law test to determine employee sta-
tus." As amended, the Act defined an employee as "any individual
who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining
the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an
employee. ' 94
In contrast, Congress chose not to change the definition of em-
ployee under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 5 Courts interpreting
that statute therefore have utilized the Hearst-Silk economic reali-
ties test suggested in Hearst and Silk to determine employee sta-
tus under the FLSA, and have focused on the dependency of the
worker on the employer." Use of the economic realities test has
resulted in an extremely flexible standard that favors inclusion of a
broad number of workers under the protection of the Act.
7
The judicial and statutory evolution of the definition of em-
ployee status in the major federal labor statutes prior to the pas-
sage of Title VII indicates that Congress made a conscious choice
to broadly define employee status under Title VII by providing no
definition at all. The Supreme Court has decided that the use of
the undefined or unlimited term "employee" should be analyzed in
Legal Implications of Conversion from One to the Other, 4 Comb]/ENT L.J. 649 (1982);
Note, Section 2(3) of the NLRA and the 'Right to Control' Test, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
768 (1982).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 410(j)(2) (1976).
94. Id. The new definition, enacted in 1951, was made retroactive to August 14, 1935.
Interestingly, this amendment did not establish a single test for employee status, but rather
provoked continuing distinctions among courts concerning the scope of the common law
test. See, e.g., Cody v. Ribicoff, 289 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1961); Fleming v. Huycke, 284 F.2d
546 (9th Cir. 1960); Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Higgins, 189 F.2d
865 (2d Cir. 1951); Kelley v. Celebrezze, 243 F. Supp. 18 (D.N.J. 1965); Millard's, Inc. v.
United States, 146 F. Supp. 385 (D.N.J. 1956); Schmidt v. Ewing, 108 F. Supp. 505 (M.D.
Pa. 1952).
95. Section 3(e)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides: "Except as provided in
paragraphs (2) and (3), the term 'employee' means any individual employed by an em-
ployer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (1976). The exceptions are for certain public employees.
96. See Weisel v. Singapore Joint Venture, Inc., 602 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1979); Dunlop v.
Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977); Mednick v. Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508
F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1975); Mitchell v. John R. Cowley & Bros., 292 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1961);
Donovan v. American Airlines, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 526 (N.D. Tex. 1981), afi'd, 686 F.2d 267
(5th Cir. 1982); Wirtz v. Silbertson, 217 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Mitchell v. Nutter,
161 F. Supp. 799 (D. Me. 1958).
97. See, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., Inc., 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979); Dono-
van v Gillmore, 535 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Ohio), dismissed, 708 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1982); Lu-
ther'v. Z. Wilson, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
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light of its statutory purpose, and if the statute is designed to serve
a broad remedial goal, the term should be broadly construed. The
Court requires specific limiting language before it will apply the
restrictive common law test of employee status. Thus, Congress'
options in drafting statutes is clear: if Congress intends courts to
utilize the restrictive common law test of employee status the stat-
ute should incorporate either the language used to modify the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act or that used to modify the Social Secur-
ity Act."' If Congress intends to create a broader test, the statute
should mirror one of the original definitions of "employee" con-
tained in the National Labor Relations Act or Social Security Act,
or the definition left intact in the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The statement in the legislative history of Title VII that the
term "employee" should be defined as in other federal labor stat-
utes is, therefore, a shorthand reference to this judicial and statu-
tory evolution of employee status in the major federal labor stat-
utes prior to Title VII. This indicates that Congress clearly chose a
broad definition of employee for Title VII purposes. Indeed, the
definition of the term employee in Title VII exactly tracks the lan-
guage of the Fair Labor Standards Act.9 9 There is no doubt that
Congress was aware of the implications of the statutory language,
particularly because it used the amended National Labor Relations
Act as a model both in drafting Title VII in 1964100 and in drafting
the 1972 amendments to Title VII.10 1 Although Title VII incorpo-
rated many other provisions of the National Labor Relations Act,
it did not incorporate its limited definition of "employee."
The legislative history thus confirms that Congress intended em-
98. Certainly there were those in Congress who wanted to amend the National Labor Re-
lations Act and the Social Security Act on the basis that Congress' original intention was
never to endorse the broad definition of employee status adopted in the Hearst and Silk
opinions. Regardless of this original intent, however, the Court had now made it clear that
restrictive language was necessary to convey this intention. If Congress intended that the
term "employee" in Title VII was to be narrowly defined, Congress would not have chosen
to draft this term in language that the Court had consistently construed to indicate a liberal
definition of employee status.
99. Section 701(f) of Title VII provides that an employee is an "individual employed by
an employer," and Section 3(e)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides that an em-
ployee is "any individual employed by an employer."
100. See Developments in the Law, supra note 71 at 1196 n.7, 1270-75.
101. Hill, supra note 69, at 32-51.
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ployee status to be broadly defined to achieve the policy goals of
the statute. Courts that have adopted the common law test of em-
ployee status, however, have ignored this legislative history These
courts have limited their inquiry into legislative history to a search
for a clear-cut statement of congressional intent regarding the
breadth or content of the definition of employee status.0 2 They
simply have neither examined nor addressed the legislative refer-
ence to other labor statutes. This mean-spirited approach not only
exemplifies inadequate statutory analysis, but also reflects an un-
willingness to consider whether the policy underlying Title VII is
served by a limited test of employee status. As the Supreme Court
has noted regarding statutory construction:
We should of course be faithful to the meaning of a statute. But
after all Congress expresses its meaning by words. If legislative
policy is couched in vague language, easily susceptible of one
meaning as well as another in the common speech of men, we
should not stifle a policy by a pedantic or grudging process of
construction.1
0 3
The courts that have adopted the common law test have not ad-
dressed the policy implications of using that test to determine em-
ployee status, while nonetheless concluding that Congress intended
to adopt that test as a matter of policy No court has examined the
policies served by the common law test or the compatibility of
these policies with the goals of Title VII. This failure to examine
the policy basis of the common law test, moreover, ignores the ori-
gin and application of that test as a shield to protect employers
from unwarranted tort liability, not as a weapon to ensure em-
ployee rights. The development of the common law test, therefore,
reflects policy considerations entirely different from, and indeed
contradictory to, the policies underlying Title VII.
102. See, e.g., Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[T]here is no
statement in the Act or legislative history of Title VII comparable to one made by Senator
Hugo Black (later Justice Black), during the debates on the Fair Labor Standards Act, that
the term 'employee' in the FLSA was given 'the broadest definition that has ever been in-
cluded in any one act. "); Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Cal.
1976) ("[There is nothing in the legislative history of the Act to indicate a Congressional
intent to construe the term 'employee' m any manner other than m accordance with com-
mon-law agency principles.").
103. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944).
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C. Policy Considerations: The Common Law Test and Title VII
The common law test of employee status evolved as a result of
economic and social developments in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. The test originated with the development of the
concept of vicarious liability, a revolutionary change in the liability
of employers grounded upon their economic status and their per-
ceived obligation to the public as a condition of doing business.
The concept of an independent contractor as distinct from an em-
ployee emerged as a limitation on vicarious liability based upon
policy considerations of fairness to employers and the assurance
that the independent contractor could assume his or her own
liability.10 4
The doctrine of vicarious liability of employers for the acts of
their employees was adopted in English common law in the early
eighteenth century. 10 Previously, the law of master and servant re-
flected the medieval concept that a master was only responsible for
acts that he had commanded his servant to do. l0 6 Beginning with a
series of cases decided at the turn of the eighteenth century, how-
ever, the idea emerged that a master could be liable for the acts of
his servant in the course of his service, regardless of whether the
servant had explicit authority to perform the particular act.10 7 By
104. See infra notes 105-123.
105. T. BATY, VICARious LIABILITY ch. 1 (1916); 8 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF EN-
GLISH LAW 472-482 (1926); O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 49-116 (1921); Wigmore,
Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARv. L. REV. 315 (1894); Laski, The Basis
of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916).
106. Wigmore has traced this rule not only to the Germanic concept of vengeance for
social wrongs but also to the gradual evolution of legal rules that justified liability on the
basis of a master's responsibility for the members of his household. Wigmore, supra note
105, at 315-18. By the end of the thirteenth century, civil or criminal liability attached to
the master only on the basis of command or consent. Id. at 335. Holmes has noted that both
the Germanic and Roman origins of this rule are based on the concept of the master's re-
sponsibility for the acts of slaves and the head of the household's responsibility for the acts
of household members. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 105, at 62-80.
107. Justice Holt is generally viewed as the originator of this rule. In a case holding the
owners of a ship liable for the damage to goods caused by the master of the ship, Holt stated
that "whoever employs another is answerable for him, and undertakes for his care to all that
make use of him." Boson v. Sandford, 2 Salk. 440, S.C. 3 Mod. 321 (1691), quoted in W.S.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 105, at 252. Another case decided by Justice Holt concerned a
servant who set a fire that damaged a neighbor's property. Holt again concluded that the
master was liable for the acts of his servant, holding that "if my servant doth anything
prejudicial to another, it shall bind me, when it may be presumed that he acts by my au-
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1725 the rule of vicarious liability was commonly stated as a set-
tled maxim of law,108 and by 1765 Blackstone stated the rule as an
established principle of the common law in his commentaries. 10 9
Blackstone's rationale, that the master's liability rested upon his
control of the servant, was not the only explanation for the rule
stated in the English decisions. Various courts justified the rule
because of the master's economic gain from the servant's work and,
therefore, justifiable liability for losses resulting from the servant's
acts; because of the master's ability to choose the servant, and thus
ensure the servant's reliability and dependability; or simply be-
cause of the impractibility of requiring the injured person to in-
quire into the legal relationship between master and servant to
know whether the master is responsible for an injury caused by the
master's servant.110
Many commentators rejected these explanations as obscuring
the economic and social basis for liability.111 The real basis for the
imposition of vicarious liability, they argued, was economic change
thority, being about my business." Turberville v. Stamp, Skinner 681, S.C. Comb. 459, 1 Ld.
Raym. 264 (1698), quoted in W.S. HOLDWORTH, supra note 105, at 474. Again, in a case
involving fraud by a servant, Holt opined that "seeing [that] somebody must be a loser by
this deceit, it is more reason that he that employs and puts a trust and confidence in the
deceiver should be a loser than a stranger." Hem v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289 (1709), quoted in
W.S. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 105, at 475.
108. See T. BATY, supra note 105, at 28.
109. If a servant, lastly, by his negligence does any damage to a stranger, the
master shall answer for his neglect: if a smith's servant lames a horse while he
is shoeing him, an action lies against the master, and not against the servant.
But in these cases the damage must be done, while he is actually employed in
the master's service; otherwise the servant shall answer for his own
misbehavior.
We may observe, that in the cases here put, the master may be frequently
the loser by the trust reposed in his servant, but never can be a gainer; he may
frequently be answerable, for his servant's misbehavior, but never can shelter
himself from punishment by laying the blame on his agent. The reason of this
is still uniform and the same; that the wrong done by the servant is looked
upon in law as the wrong of the master himself; and it is a standing maxim,
that no man shall be allowed to make any advantage of his own wrong.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMmENTARMEs *431-32.
110. See T. BATY, supra note 105, at 31-32.
111. See, e.g., T. BATY, supra note 105, ch. 1; O.W. HOLMES, supra note 105, at 102-116;
Laski, supra note 105, at 109.
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and considerations of public policy." 2 The shift from a medieval to
a merchant economy fundamentally changed social, as well as eco-
nomic, relationships. The broader scope of business relationships,
coupled with public dependence on the reliability and responsibil-
ity of those conducting businesses, required employers to be liable
for the acts of employees as a cost of doing business." 3 The em-
ployer had ultimate control over the acts of his employees, was
most able to pay, and could pass on the cost to the public. By the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, court decisions began to re-
flect this perception. In place of the legal fictions originally used to
justify vicarious liability, there emerged a justification of the rule
based on public policy: .
This rule is obviously founded on the great principle of social
duty, that every man, in the management of his own affairs,
whether by himself or by his agents or servants, shall so conduct
them as not to injure another; and if he does not, and another
thereby sustains damage, he shall answer for it. If done by a
servant, in the course of his employment, and acting within the
scope of his authority, it is considered, in contemplation of law,
so far the act of the master, that the latter shall be answerable
civiliter. . . The maxim respondeat superior is adopted in
that case, from general considerations of policy and security."4
The recognition of the status of an independent contractor as
distinct from a servant or employee evolved as a limitation on the
vicarious liability of employers from similar economic and public
policy concerns. The rule of vicarious liability developed without
much attention to the nature of the employment relationship. By
the early nineteenth century, however, courts confronted the issue
of the scope of the employment relationship in determining
whether vicarious liability should apply in all circumstances. 115
The increase in industrial activity during the first half of the cen-
tury was accompanied by enormous growth in the number and va-
112. See Laski, supra note 105, at 111-114; W.S. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 105, at 477-
478.
113. See supra note 112.
114. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Ry. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 55-56 (1842) (empha-
sis in original).
115. Steffun, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. CHI. L. RE v. 501, 511-12
(1935).
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riety of independent contractors.1 ' These individuals commonly
were hired for a particular skill, on the, assumption that there
would be no responsibility for their conduct while the service was
being rendered." 7 As one commentator has noted, "It would have
been inconceivable that any court, caught in this storm of expan-
sion and imbued with the ideas of rugged individualism then cur-
rent, could have done other than find the law necessary to make
the contractor's business thrive and to encourage immensely his
employer."""
The English and American courts thus were impelled to develop
a test of employee status to limit the reach of vicarious liability.
The courts were concerned that employers not be saddled with un-
limited liability for all parties with whom they contracted for ser-
vices. Furthermore, these courts believed that liability could be im-
posed, and as a practical matter could be assumed, by workers who
essentially were independent businessmen.
A rule distinguishing employees and independent contractors
appeared in the English cases by the mid-nineteenth century.
These cases distinguished employees and independent contractors
by examining whether the employer controlled the performance of
the work.' 9 American courts quickly adopted the right-to-control
test as the means of defining employee status. The New York
116. Id.
117. Id. at 512.
118. Id.
119. In Milligan v. Wedge, 12 Adol. & El. 737, 113 Eng. Rep. 993 (1840), the court held
that an employer was not liable for injury caused by a licensed drover hired to drive a
bullock from one town to another. The decision rested on the determination that the drover
was a servant. "For, where the person who does the injury exercises an independent employ-
ment, the party employing him is clearly not liable." 113 Eng. Rep. at 995 (Williams, J.,
concurring). The test of employment status was more fully stated in Sadler v. Henlock, 4 El.
& Bl. 570, 119 Eng. Rep. 209 (1855). Sadler is the case usually credited with defining the
common law distinction between employees and independent contractors. In Sadler, the
employer hired a laborer to clean out a drain crossing the defendant's land, which the la-
borer had originally dug. In the course of doing this work, material was put on the adjoining
highway, causing injury to a horse passing on the road. The judges agreed that the laborer
was the employer's servant: "The test here is, whethei the defendant retained the power of
controlling the work. No distinction can be drawn from the circumstance of the man being
employed at so much a day or by the job. I think that here the relation was that of master
and servant, not of contractor and contractee." 119 Eng. Rep. at 212 (Crompton, J., concur-
ring). English courts have continued, as have their American counterparts, to use the right-
to-control test to determine employee status. See BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
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Court of Appeals stated the rule in 1851 in terms of respondeat
superior: "It is founded on the power which the superior has a
right to exercise, and which for the prevention of injuries to third
persons he is bound to exercise, over the acts of his subordi-
nates. ' 120 This view was echoed by the California Supreme Court
in 1857, in a case in which the liability of employers was stated in
similar terms:
The relation between parties to which responsibility attaches to
one, for the acts of negligence of the other, must be that of supe-
rior and subordinate, or, as it is generally expressed, of master
and servant, in which the latter is subject to the control of the
former. The responsibility is placed where the power exists.
Having power to control, the superior or master is bound to ex-
ercise it to the prevention of injuries to third parties, or he will
be held liable.'21
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, after
carefully reviewing English and American authority, refused to
place liability on an employer for one not deemed to be an em-
ployee by virtue of the employer's lack of control. The court rea-
soned: "[The act] was not done by one whom [the employer] had
the right to command, over whose conduct he had the efficient con-
trol, whose operations he might direct, whose negligence he might
restrain.
122
The right-to-control has remained the cornerstone of the com-
mon law test of employee status, reflecting a perception of fairness
and sound public policy that employers should be held vicariously
liable for the acts of employees only when the employer has the
means to control that liability. This perception is grounded in the
assurance that the independent contractor, as one who performs
services for the employer beyond the employer's control, is more
akin to an independent businessman. As with an employer, an in-
dependent contractor can absorb the costs of his own intentional
or negligent torts in the course of doing business. In other words,
12-16 (Webber 5th ed.) (1967); BowsTrAD ON AGENCY 12-13 (Reynolds & Davenport 14th ed.
1976); FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF AGENCY 19-25 (4th ed. 1976).
120. Blake v. Ferris, 5 N.Y. 48, 54 (1851).
121. Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469, 489 (1857).
122. Hilliard v. Richardson, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 349, 366 (1855).
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the freedom of the independent contractor from the control of a
superior is offset by the imposition of independent liability.123
The focus on the employer's perspective of the employment rela-
tionship stands in stark contrast to the public policy underlying
Title VII and the goals of that statute. The passage of Title VII
had its impetus in evidence of pervasive employment discrimina-
tion, particularly on the basis of race, and a commitment to the
goal of equal employment opportunity.124 The breadth of the prob-
lem dictated the sweeping prohibitions of Title VII and the impo-
sition of these prohibitions upon all who controlled employment
opportunities-employers, unions, and employment agencies-to
require that employment decisions be made without reference to
race, sex, national origin or religion. Judicial interpretation of the
statute has consistently reflected the policy determination that the
statute was intended to be far-reaching and, therefore, should be
construed to provide broad protection to individuals who may be
affected by such discrimination in order that substantive rights are
not sacrificed to legal technicalities. 25
These policy considerations are fundamentally different from
those that underlie the common law test of employee status limit-
ing an employer's vicarious liability. The policy underlying Title
VII encourages the expansion of employer liability to encompass
all conduct that deprives individuals of employment opportunities
on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin. In determining
potential employment discrimination, the statute is intended to
reach the broadest range of employment relationships. The ques-
tion whether the employer has the right to control the physical
conduct of employees is irrelevant to these concerns. Rather, the
policy concerns of Title VII dictate the necessity of a test examin-
ing the employer's ability to control the employee's work opportu-
123. See O.W HOLMES, supra note 105, at 102-104. For additional modem views espous-
ing the same argument that independent contractors should assume "enterprise liability,"
see Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 594-603
(1929); Note, Employers Beware: You May Be Liable For the Negligence of Your Indepen-
dent Contractor, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 275 (1980).
124. See H. R. REP. No. 914, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2355; H.R. RFP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137.
125. See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); McDonnell Douglass
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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nities and to erect barriers to those opportunities by discrimina-
tory conduct.
Using the common law test of employee status under Title VII is
simply inappropriate. At its worst, the practice erects yet another
barrier to equal employment opportunity. The rigid classification
of employees and independent contractors under the common law
test unduly denies the protection of Title VII to workers who are
dependent on employers by virtue of the employer's control of the
employment marketplace or of the terms and conditions of em-
ployment. A proper test of employee status is one that reflects the
remedial goals of the statute by examining the economic realities
of the relationship and the opportunity for employment discrimi-
nation that Title VII was intended to prohibit. By examining the
"economic realities" of the employment relationship, several courts
have begun the process of developing a test of employee status
that addresses the policy concerns of Title VII.
III. THE "ECONOMIC REALITIES" TEST OF EMPLOYEE STATUS
A. Development of the Test
An "economic realities" test of employee status has emerged
from cases that have scrutinized the ability of employers and other
entities to control access to employment opportunities and the
terms and conditions of employment. In examining employment
relationships, these courts have looked to the balance of power in
the relationship and whether the alleged employee is in a position
in which he or she may be subject to the effects of unlawful dis-
crimination. Although the courts initially continued to consider the
right to control the employee, the critical inquiry of the common
law test, as a factor in this approach, the courts have progressively
abandoned that factor as irrelevant in determining employee
status.
The first case to take a different approach to the issue of defin-
ing employee status under Title VII was the 1973 decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson.'26 The plaintiff in Sib-
ley alleged that he had been the victim of sex discrimination by
126. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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the defendant hospital because he was denied the opportunity to
serve as a private duty nurse to a female patient. The hospital ac-
ted as an intermediary between patients and private duty nurses,
informing patients of the services to which the hospital could refer
the patient's request, and of the hospital's policy of non-discrimi-
nation in the referral process. Names of nurses were provided by
the hospital in response to requests by patients, and the patient
was obligated to pay one day's wages if a qualified nurse who was
referred was not hired. The plaintiff claimed that the hospital's
nurse supervisors on two occasions refused to provide his name to
female patients because of his sex.12
The hospital argued that, because no employment relationship
existed between the plaintiff and the hospital, the plaintiff had no
cause of action under Title VII.128 The court rejected this view,
finding that the language of the statute and its legislative history
clearly indicated that Title VII was intended to reach beyond the
immediate employment relationship, and concluded that the broad
prohibition in the Act against discrimination in "employment op-
portunities" could only be achieved if both direct and indirect bar-
riers to job opportunities were eliminated:
Control over access to the job market may reside, depending
upon the circumstances of the case, in a labor organization, an
employment agency, or an employer as defined in Title VII; and
it would appear that Congress has determined to prohibit each
of these from exerting any power it may have to foreclose, on
[invidious] grounds, access by any individual to employment op-
portunities otherwise available to him. To permit a covered em-
ployer to exploit circumstances peculiarly affording it the capa-
bility of discriminatorily interfering with an individual's
employment opportunities with another employer, while it could
not do so with respect to employment in its own service, would
be to condone continued use of the very criteria for employment
that Congress has prohibited.129
Thus, the key to the court's analysis was the hospital's control
over the plaintiff's employment opportunities by determining his
127. See id. at 1339.
128. See id. at 1340.
129. Id. at 1341.
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access to employment by patients.130 The focus of the court's in-
quiry, therefore, was on the economic realities of the relationship,
particularly the dependency of the plaintiff on the hospital in ob-
taining employment opportunities, and the hospital's ability to
deny access to those opportunities on invidious grounds. The for-
mal relationship between the plaintiff and the hospital was irrele-
vant to a determination of whether the hospital had the power to
affect the plaintiff's employment opportunities.
Other courts have followed the Sibley analysis in a variety of
contexts in which a third party controls access to employment op-
portunities.131 Courts have held licensing bodies 32 and professional
associations' liable under Title VII based on their control of stan-
130. See id. at 1342.
131. See Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983); Nais-
mith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Spirit v. Teachers Ins.
and Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983); Vanguard Justice
Soc'y v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670 (D. Md. 1979); Gill v. Monroe County Dept. of Social
Servs., 79 F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Curran v. Portland Superintending School Comm.,
435 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Me. 1977); Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 246 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Williams v. Southern Ry. Sys., 15 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 959 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089
(D.N.H. 1974).
132. Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 246 (N.D.
IlM. 1977) (if class of respiratory therapists alleging racially discriminatory testing by defen-
dant licensing body could demonstrate defendant controlled access to employment, a suffi-
cient employment relationship would exist to assert Title VII jurisdiction); Puntolillo v.
New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974) (regulatory agency that
governed horse racing activity controlled access to employment and was liable under Title
VII for alleged national origin discrimination based on agency's control of licenses necessary
to engage in horse racing).
133. Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n., 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (Professional
Golfers Association whose principal function was assisting its members in gaining employ-
ment and sponsoring professional tournaments could be liable for alleged sex discrimina-
tion); Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974) (New
Hampshire Trotting and Breeding Association, which controls and assigns stall space neces-
sary for driver trainers, could be held liable for alleged national origin discrimination). In a
series of cases involving the issue whether state bar examiners could be liable under Title
VII for alleged discrimination in bar examinations, the courts have decided that the examin-
ers were not liable under Title VII, despite the direct relationship between licensing and the
right to practice law. See Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 940 (1976); Delgado v. McTighe, 422 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Woodward v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 420 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Va. 1976), afl'd, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir.
1979). In none of those cases, however, did the courts rest their conclusion on a rejection of
the argument that the examiners controlled access to employment. In Tyler the court of-
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dards of access to employment for particular professions. Similarly,
government entities have been held accountable under Title VII by
virtue of their control of funding or their exercise of other statu-
tory duties that affect the terms and conditions of employment. 13
Administrators of an employer's pension plan have been deemed
proper defendants under Title VII based on their control of an em-
ployment benefit. 135
The result of applying an economic realities test in these cases
has been to bring within the reach of the statute's prohibitions en-
tities that might not otherwise be subject to Title VII as employ-
ers, but nevertheless exert substantial control over employment
opportunities or the terms and conditions of employment.1 36
Courts have based the liability of these entities for discriminatory
conduct on their control of employment opportunities ranging
from the power to block all access into a particular profession 3 7 to
fered no reasoning to support its conclusion that the Board of Bar Examiners was not an
employer. See 517 F.2d at 1096. In Woodward the court simply rejected the contention that
the bar examination was comparable to employer tests found unlawful in Albemarle v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), and Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See 420 F.
Supp. at 214. The Delgado court followed Woodward and Tyler without further discussion.
134. Vanguard Justice Soc'y v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 696 (D. Md. 1979) (City Civil
Service Commission was proper defendant where commission "exercised substantial author-
ity and discretion in the area of testing of applicants for entry level positions"); Gill v.
Monroe County Dept. of Social Servs., 79 F.R.D. 316, 334 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (state defen-
dants are liable under Title VII if they are proved to exercise control over examinations, job
qualifications, and titles for county job opportunities); Curran v. Portland Superintending
School Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063, 1073 (D. Me. 1977) (city's control of funding for school
personnel is sufficient to assert jurisdiction under Title VII).
135. Hackett v. McGuire, 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971); Spirit v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity
Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
136. In several cases the courts have noted that the parties who control employment op-
portunities would be employers under Title VII. See, e.g., Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hasp. of
San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1983); Sibley Memorial Hasp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d
1338, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In many cases, however, the question of employer status is
entirely ignored. See, e.g., Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 21 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 246 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Williams v. Southern Ry. Sys., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 959
(S.D. Ohio 1976). An alternative analysis in several decisions considers third parties who
control employment opportunities as agents of the employer. See, e.g., Spirit v. Teachers
Ins. and Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Curran v. Portland Super-
intending School Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063, 1073 (D. Me. 1977).
137. See, e.g., Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979);
Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089- (D.N.H. 1974); Veizaga v.
National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 246 (N.D. IM. 1977).
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the ability to deny access to a single employment opportunity3 8 at
various stages in the employment relationship. 3 9
The most recent case to use the broad, flexible economic realities
test in analyzing an indirect employment relationship is Gomez v.
Alexian Brothers Hospital of San Jose.140 In that case the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the defendant hospital was liable for alleged national origin dis-
crimination toward a physician who practiced under a professional
corporate name. The plaintiff had submitted a proposal, in the
name of the corporation, to staff the defendant's emergency room.
The hospital allegedly denied the proposal because the plaintiff
and many of the proposed staff were Hispanic. The hospital argued
that the plaintiff was an independent contractor not covered by
Title VII.1' The court disagreed, holding that the hospital's denial
of the contract had affected the conditions of the plaintiff's em-
ployment by limiting his employment opportunities. 42 Both the
plaintiff's control of the corporation and the corporation's lack of
agency status, failed to alter the court's analysis. Rather, the court
focused on the economic relationship between the parties and the
control of employment opportunity. 43
Courts also have used the economic realities approach to analyze
direct employment relationships to determine whether the individ-
ual claiming discriminatory treatment is an employee covered by
the statute. 44 Courts have drawn upon the Sibley analysis of indi-
138. See Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983); Sibley
Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
139. See, e.g., Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (hir-
ing); Spirit v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (pen-
sion); William v. Southern Ry. Sys., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 959 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
(seniority).
140. 698 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983).
141. See id. at 1021.
142. See id.
143. See id. The court refused to consider itself bound by Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co.,
410 F. Supp. 513 (9th Cir. 1978), on the basis of a local rule that Court of Appeals affir-
mances without opinion have no precedential value. See United States v. Allard, 600 F.2d
1301, 1306 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979).
144. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983); Unger v. Consolidated
Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 456 U.S. 1002 (1982);
Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Mathis v. Standard Brands Chem.
Indus., Inc., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 295 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
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rect employment relationships and also have utilized the earlier
Hearst and Silk analyses of direct employment relationships. Sig-
nificantly, although these courts initially incorporated the right-to-
control factor of the common law test to a greater or lesser degree,
the trend is toward a total abandonment of that consideration as
irrelevant to the analysis. As in the cases that examined third par-
ties' control of employment opportunities, the focus of these deci-
sions has been on whether the employer has significant control
over either an individual's employment opportunities or the terms
and conditions of employment which could subject the individual
to the discriminatory conduct that Title VII was intended to
prohibit.1 5
The first direct employment relationship case to adopt the eco-
nomic realities test of employee status was Mathis v. Standard
Brands Chemical Industries.146 In Mathis, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant refused to renew his contract to provide indus-
trial waste removal services for racially discriminatory reasons.
The defendant claimed that the plaintiff was an independent con-
tractor, and thus not protected by Title VII. The plaintiff owned
the equipment used to perform the work, employed other individu-
als to perform the work, and was paid at a set rate that permitted
him to control his profits based on his ability to minimize costs. All
of these factors, the defendant argued, indicated the plaintiff was
an independent businessman. 147 On the other hand, the plaintiff
emphasized that he personally performed other work for the defen-
dant that was supervised by the defendant and was paid at an
hourly rate. He argued that these factors tended to show an em-
145. In 1978 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) also adopted the
economic realities test as the basis for determining workers to be included in EEO-1 reports
required of federal contractors. New Developments, EMPL. PRAc. GUmE (CCH) 1 5001
(1978). The EEOC suggested that the definition of employee, which was then tied to the
standard of the Social Security Act, be stated as a baseline rather than as an outer limit of
those considered to be employees. Alternatively, it was suggested that the definition also
state that "any individual in a service relationship wherein the economic facts of the rela-
tionship make it more nearly one of employment than of an independent business enter-
prise" would be considered an employee. Id. The Commission subsequently abandoned this
test, and currently defines employee status according to the Social Security Act, thereby
applying the common law test of employee status. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.2 (1983).
146. 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 295 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
147. See id. at 297.
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ployment relationship rather than an independent contractual bus-
iness relationship.148
The court addressed the issue as a question of standing and,
after finding no dispute that the plaintiff had suffered injury in
fact, focused on whether the plaintiff had asserted a claim within
the protection of Title VII.149 Acknowledging that Title VII ad-
dresses employment discrimination, the court recognized the ne-
cessity of distinguishing between employment relationships and
contractual associations of independent business entities.150 The
court reasoned that the distinction was based upon the economic
realities of the relationship between the parties.' 51 Paraphrasing
the Silk test, the court noted that the following considerations
were among those that should be examined to determine the
relationship:
Whether the plaintiff received compensation in the form of sal-
ary or wages as opposed to profits derived from a contractual
fee, the opportunities to increase profit by management of re-
sources, the degree of control by the manner and method in
which the work is performed and the extent to which the plain-
tiff personally executed his tasks. 5'
The court thus included the common law control factor in its anal-
ysis, but only as one of many factors to be considered in determin-
ing employee status.
The common law factor of control of the means and method of
work also was included as one of the considerations in determining
employee status in Spirides v. Reinhart, a 1979 decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."6 3 In
Spirides, the court considered whether a foreign language broad-
caster employed by a division of the Voice of America was an em-
ployee under Title VII. The district court principally had relied on
the contract between the parties, which denominated the plaintiff
148. See id. at 297-98.
149. See id. at 296; see also Association of Data Processing Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
150. See id. 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 297.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657
F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981).
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an independent contractor, to determine the plaintiff's status.""
On appeal, the court found that this contractual designation was
not controlling; rather, the issue required an examination of "the
'economic realities' of the work relationship.' 1 55 The economic re-
alities test adopted by the court was an amalgam of the Silk test
and a broad version of the common law test based on the factors
outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 5 The court
placed greater emphasis on the factor of the employer's right to
control the means and methods of work than had the court in
Mathis: "[T]he extent of the employer's right to control the
'means and manner' of the worker's performance is the most im-
portant factor to review here, as it is at common law.' 57 Neverthe-
less the court also suggested additional factors that should be ex-
amined to determine whether an individual was an employee:
Additional matters of fact that . . . [a] reviewing court must
consider include, among others, (1) the kind of occupation, with
reference to whether the work usually is done under the direc-
tion of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without supervi-
sion; (2) the skill required in the particular occupation; (3)
whether the 'employer' or the individual in question furnishes
the equipment used and the place of work; (4) the length of time
during which the individual has worked; (5) the method of pay-
ment, whether by time or by the job; (6) the manner in which
the work relationship is terminated; i.e., by one or both parties,
with or without notice and explanation; (7) whether annual
leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the
business of the 'employer'; (9) whether the worker accumulates
retirement benefits; (10) whether the 'employer' pays social se-
curity taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties. 58
The court therefore adopted a mixed test of employee status
that incorporates many of the factors originally used in the com-
mon law test, and factors deriving from Silk that focus less on the
structure of the relationship than on the potential for discrimina-
tory treatment arising from an economic dependency on the em-
154. 613 F.2d at 832.
155. See id. at 831.
156. See id. at 831 n.26 and 832; see also supra note 20.
157. See Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831.
158. Id. at 832.
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ployer.' 59 The court's elevation of the control factor to a position of
critical importance, however, suggests that this analysis easily
could be oversimplified to an examination of this factor alone, thus
overshadowing the court's effort to suggest a broader framework of
analysis. 60
In the most recent case confronting the issue of employee status,
however, the court completely abandoned the right-to-control fac-
tor. In Armbruster v. Quinn,'6' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit examined the issue of employee status in a
sex discrimination case. The employer claimed it had an insuffi-
cient number of employees to be subject to Title VII because its
manufacturer's representatives were independent contractors who
could not be counted toward the statutory minimum. 162 The dis-
trict court had held that the representatives were independent
contractors based on characteristics of the relationship that would
indeed have indicated this status under the common law test: the
representatives were paid on commission, did not work out of the
defendant's corporate offices, were free to sell other products, set
their own hours, and chose their own clients. Furthermore, the de-
fendant did not withhold income tax or other taxes from their
salary.16
3
159. In Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, citing Spirides, stated that the appropriate
test of employee status centered on the economic realities of the relationship and the degree
of control the employer exercises over the alleged employee. See 657 F.2d at 915 n.8. The
court stressed that numerous factors should be considered in making this determination.
Accordingly, the court upheld the lower court's determination that a sales representative
was an employee based on the defendant's "economic and managerial control," including
payment of some business expenses, requiring regular sales reports, the lengthy relationship
between the parties and the compensation structure. See id.
160. Indeed, this tendency is apparent in several age discrimination cases that have
adopted the mixed test of employee status. See Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979
(4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32 (3rd Cir. 1983). The definition of
employee in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976
& Supp. V 1981), is similar to that in Title VII, and because the ADEA was modelled after
Title VII, courts confronted with the issue of employee status under the ADEA have looked
to the Title VII cases for the appropriate analysis. In Garrett and Zippo Manufacturing,
both courts adopted a mixed test but nevertheless rested their conclusions exclusively on
the right-to-control factor.
161. 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
162. See id. at 1339.
163. See id.
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The Sixth Circuit held that the district court had applied an in-
appropriate and unduly narrow test of employee status. 64 Accord-
ing to the court, the statutory language and legislative history of
Title VII indicate that Congress intended the term "employee" to
include "the full range of workers who may be subject to the harms
the statute was designed to prevent, unless such workers are ex-
cluded by a specific statutory exception.' 1 65 Citing Hearst, the
court reasoned that employee status should be construed liberally
in view of the broad remedial purpose of the statute:
The term employee in Title VII 'must be read in light of the
mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.' The mis-
chief to be corrected is that discrimination in employment op-
portunity has been made unlawful by Title VII's violation provi-
sions: the end, to rid from the world of work the evil of
discrimination because of an individual's race, color, religion, sex
or national origin.168
Accordingly, the court remanded the case for further considera-
tion of the economic realities of the relationship between the em-
ployer and the manufacturer's representatives and directed the
district court to examine "whether the manufacturer's representa-
tives are susceptible to the kind of unlawful practices that Title
VII was intended to remedy."6 7 The court suggested consideration
of the following non-exclusive factors: hiring and termination pro-
cedures, advancement opportunities, compensation structure (in-
cluding benefits), and the historical position of the representatives
in the defendant's business."6 8
The touchstone of the Sixth Circuit's analysis is whether the in-
dividual claiming employment discrimination could, by virtue of
the economic realities of the relationship, be subject to "the mis-
164. See id. at 1341-42.
165. Id. at 1339. Particularly, the court noted that Congress used the National Labor
Relations Act as a model when drafting Title VII, and therefore surely was aware of Hearst
and its progeny. Thus, the court concluded, it was logical to assume Congress intended that
the term "employee" in Title VII was to be liberally construed. 711 F.2d at 1341.
166. Id. at 1340 (citations omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111,
124 (1944)).
167. 711 F.2d at 1342.
168. See id. at n.9.
1984]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
chief to be corrected and the end to be attained" by Title VII."
The analysis, therefore, is keyed to the perspective of the alleged
employee, and the potential for employment discrimination arising
from the employer's economic dominance of the relationship.
The test outlined by the Armbruster court is a complete break
with the common law analysis of employee status. Freed from the
constricting effect of that test and its emphasis on the employer's
right of control, the analysis focuses on the economic realities that
permit employment discrimination to occur. Along with the test of
indirect employment relationships that also focuses on the actual
control of employment opportunities, it provides a framework for
analysis that ensures broad protection of workers potentially sub-
ject to employment discrimination.
B. The Economic Realities Test and Title VII
The economic realities test has evolved from the recognition that
the definition of employee status should be liberally construed to
achieve the broad remedial goals of Title VII. The test accords
with the sweeping scope of the overall statutory scheme, and is
supported by the clear intent of Congress in the legislative history
that this term was to be broadly defined. The test also reflects the
fundamental recognition that the definition of employee status
must be tied to the policy of the statute and the perception it em-
bodies of the nature of employment discrimination.
This policy analysis has required the rejection of the common
law test of employee status as an unduly limited and fundamen-
tally inappropriate test that fails to recognize the remedial goals of
Title VII. Courts have progressively discounted and finally aban-
doned the common law's emphasis on the right to control as an
irrelevant consideration in determining whether particular workers
are subject to employment discrimination.
Control of employment opportunities is the linchpin of the eco-
nomic realities test, viewed from the perspective of the employee's
dependency on the employer and vulnerability to discriminatory
conduct. This focus requires an analysis of the economic terms of
particular relationships on a case-by-case basis, rather than on the
169. Id.
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basis of a catalogue of immutable factors. The flexibility of this
analysis is essential to avoid the rigidity of the common law test
and to accommodate the present range of employment relation-
ships and the new patterns that may evolve in the future.
Some guidelines, however, can be suggested with respect to the
kinds of factors that courts can consider within this flexible frame-
work. When an indirect employment relationship is under consid-
eration, courts should focus on whether the third party can affect
or control an employment relationship by its control of hiring deci-
sions or of the terms and conditions of employment. This examina-
tion must encompass all possible roles, ranging from a formal
agency relationship with the employer to a position of control in
the employment structure of particular terms and conditions of
employment. Control must be measured on the basis of whether
there is a reasonable probability that the actions of a third party
could significantly affect equal employment opportunity.
Similarly, regarding direct employment relationships, the focus
of the analysis must be on whether the employer controls employ-
ment opportunities because of its position in the employment mar-
ketplace or because of its ability to determine the terms and condi-
tions of employment. This requires an economic analysis of
institutional and societal patterns of discrimination that affect the
employment marketplace, 17 0 as well as an examination of the pre-
cise characteristics of the particular employment relationship. The
inquiry must focus on whether the employer's control of employ-
ment opportunities places the worker in a position of dependency
on the employer which may expose the worker to discriminatory
conduct.
Among the considerations that might be examined are the struc-
ture and nature of the employer's business; hiring, promotion and
termination procedures; the structure of compensation and stan-
dards of performance; referral to and control of the employment
market; and the degree of integration of the worker in the em-
ployer's business. Other relevant factors are whether the worker is
hired for a particular skill, or is unskilled or trained by the em-
170. Such analysis may benefit from economic tests drawn from antitrust analysis. See 11
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTI-TRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-TRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION §§ 500-534 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
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ployer; whether the worker can hire others to perform the work
without the employer's approval; and whether the worker provides
equipment or other resources to perform the work. The means and
methods of performance are relevant not to determine the em-
ployer's control over the physical conduct of the worker, but rather
to analyze the relative power and bargaining position of the em-
ployer and the worker so as to determine the potential for employ-
ment discrimination.
The usefulness of the economic realities test rests on the flex-
ibility of its analysis. The factors that courts should consider,
therefore, must not be limited to a particular scheme, but rather
must encompass various types of employment relationships that
might provide the opportunity for discriminatory conduct. This
broad analysis will ensure that the wide range of individuals sub-
ject to employment discrimination will be protected by the guaran-
tees of Title VII, thus aiding equal employment opportunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
The importance of providing a remedy for employment discrimi-
nation is as critical today as it was at the passage of Title VII.
Employment discrimination remains a pervasive reality in our soci-
ety despite the removal of many of the most extreme and arbitrary
barriers to equal employment opportunities. Faced with this real-
ity, it is essential that Title VII provide a remedy for employment
discrimination to all workers who may be subject to an employer's
ability to discriminate. A liberal definition of employee status is
critical to that goal, as part of an interlocking structure that guar-
antees the broadest possible access to protection against employ-
ment discrimination. The economic realities test ensures that goal
by focusing on the employer's ability to erect arbitrary, unneces-
sary barriers to employment opportunities based on race, sex, reli-
gion or national origin. This broad test is essential to guaranteeing
that the policies and goals of Title VII will be achieved.
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